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We present a joint analysis of the term structure of credit default swap (CDS) spreads and 
the implied volatility surface for the United States and five European countries from 2007–
2012, a sample period covering both the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the European 
debt crisis. We analyze to which extent effective cross-hedges can be performed between 
the CDS and equity derivatives markets during these two crises. We find that during a global 
crisis a breakdown of the relationship between credit risk and equity volatility may occur, 
jeopardizing any cross-hedging strategy, which happened during the GFC. This stands in sharp 
contrast to the more localized European debt crisis, during which this fundamental relationship 
was preserved despite turbulent market conditions for both the CDS and volatility markets. 
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1. Introduction
Merton (1974) stresses the intrinsic relationship between 
credit spreads and equity volatility. A plethora of articles 
have studied this interrelation since, measuring credit 
spreads with yield spreads computed from bonds and 
equity volatility with mean squared returns. More recently, 
the rapid development of the credit default swap (CDS) 
market has provided convenient products to extract credit 
risk. Furthermore, the availability of implied volatility has led 
to a preferable alternative way to quantify equity volatility 
because option volatility is considered “forward looking”. 
Therefore, over the last years many studies have focused on 
the interaction between CDS spreads and implied volatility. 
A first set of papers analyses the relation between the 
5-year CDS spread and the at-the-money (ATM) 1-month 
implied volatility, see Benkert (2004) and Forte and Pena 
(2009), for example. 
This kind of study was extended by considering other 
parts of the implied volatility surface (beyond the 1-month 
ATM volatility) and/or the term structure of CDS spreads 
(beyond the 5-year CDS spread). Cao, Yu and Zhong 
(2010) analyse the 5-year CDS spread along with the at-
the-money implied volatility and the implied volatility skew 
(see also Cao, Yu and Zhong, 2011), where the implied 
volatility skew can be defined as either the slope of the ATM 
smile or the difference between in-the-money and out-of-
the-money implied volatility, for a given time to maturity. 
Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout and Weinbaum (2008) 
analyse the impact of both implied volatility (ATM) and the 
implied volatility skew on corporate bond credit spreads 
(long and short maturities) and find that these variables 
have strong explanatory power. Carr and Wu (2010) find 
a significant correlation between the level and the skew of 
the smile and the average (along the term structure axis) of 
the CDS spread on corporate data. Hui and Chung (2011) 
study the 10-delta dollar-euro implied volatility in relation 
to the 5-year sovereign CDS spread. Han and Zhou (2011) 
find that the term structure of CDS spreads explains log 
stock returns; hence, the slope of the CDS curve contains 
relevant information for the stock dynamics.
These works have led to the development of joint models 
for the equity derivatives and CDS markets. Along this line, 
Carr and Wu (2007, 2010) propose a joint model for the term 
structure of CDS spreads and options, whilst Carverhill and 
Luo (2011) analyse the interaction between the factors of a 
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model calibrated on collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) 
and the factors driving the implied volatility surface. Collin-
Dufresne, Goldstein and Yang (2012) propose a joint analysis 
of index options and CDOs. Da Fonseca and Gottschalk 
(2013) jointly analyse the entire implied volatility surface 
and the entire term structure of CDS spreads, using factor 
decompositions, and perform a cross-hedging analysis 
between the two markets.
In this article, we analyse how crises affect the intrinsic 
relationship that ties together the CDS and equity 
derivatives markets. Using a sample from May 2007 to 
September 2012 for major index options (S&P500, CAC40, 
FTSE100, DAX30, IBEX35, MIB40) and the term structure of 
CDS spreads computed for each country, we analyse the 
joint evolution of these two markets. We find that during the 
Global Financial Crisis (2007–2009) the relation between 
the credit and volatility markets breaks down although the 
crisis affects both of them. The results are different beyond 
2009, during the European debt crisis, when the relationship 
between the markets is preserved although the European 
countries are affected very differently by the crisis. As 
a result, we conclude that there can be a breakdown of 
the credit-volatility relationship during global crises, which 
jeopardizes the effectiveness of cross-hedges between 
credit and equity instruments. During the GFC, this problem 
could have been overcome by performing a hedge within 
the same type of market, but across different geographic 
locations (i.e. European CDS with US CDS or European 
volatility with US volatility).
The main results can be summarised as follows. First, we 
show that the simple framework proposed in Da Fonseca 
and Gottschalk (2013) allows us to perform a reasonably 
effective cross-hedge between the CDS and equity 
derivatives markets. Second, we illustrate the fact that the 
relationship between the two markets can break down 
during a global crisis. In order to perform an effective 
hedge the cross-hedging position should be completed 
with a position on a similar product. Third, from a regulatory 
point of view our research underlines the claim for more 
stringent provisioning of hedgeable claims to cope with 
systemic risk.
2. Data
A credit default swap (CDS) is a credit derivative contract 
between two counterparties that essentially provides 
insurance against the default of an underlying entity. In 
a CDS, the protection buyer makes periodic payments to 
the protection seller until the occurrence of a credit event 
or the maturity date of the contract, whichever is first. The 
premium paid by the buyer is denoted as an annualized 
spread in basis points and referred to as CDS spread. 
If a credit event (default) occurs on the underlying 
financial instrument, the buyer is compensated for the loss 
incurred as a result of the credit event, i.e. the difference 
between the par value of the bond and its market value 
after default.
Our dataset uses credit default swaps on corporate 
bonds and comprises the evolution of the term structure 
of CDS spreads for five European countries: the United 
Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. We collect 
daily time series from Markit at maturities of 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 5, 
7, and 10 years from May 23, 2007 to September 17, 2012. 
We take non-sovereign entities from all sectors; the CDSs 
are written on senior unsecured debt and denominated 
in Euro. For each country and each maturity we average 
the individual CDS spreads. For comparison purposes, we 
also report the North American benchmark CDS index CDX.
NA.IG. For this index, for each maturity we average among 
the 125 entities that constitute the index. As the time period 
investigated spans both the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
and the European debt crisis, we split the full sample 
period into two subsamples for all our analyses. The first 
subsample (May 23, 2007 – December 31, 2009) contains 
the US credit crunch and the GFC; the second subsample 
(January 1, 2010 – September 17, 2012) is more tranquil 
for most countries, with the exception of Spain (and also 
Italy), where the turbulences of the European debt crisis are 
clearly visible in CDS levels.
Figures 1-4 reflect the turmoil of the GFC from mid-2007 
onwards, with CDS levels peaking at over 700 basis points 
in most countries around the default of Lehman Brothers 
(September 2008). During this period of hefty turbulence 
the term structure of CDS spreads becomes inverted. While 
CDS spreads come down in mid-2009 and the term structure 
returns to a normal positively-sloped shape, the onset of 
the European debt crisis is visible in the European markets 
from mid-2010 onwards when CDS prices start to rise again. 
While we observe moderate increases in the price of credit 
protection for corporates in France (and Germany), CDS 
levels in Spain (and Italy) show dramatic increases.
30 
Figure 1. Term structure of CDS spreads for the United States
. 
Figure 2. Term structure of CDS spreads for the United Kingdom
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Figure 3. Term structure of CDS spreads for France
. 
Figure 4. Term structure of CDS spreads for Spain
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The first subsample (May 2007 – December 2009) displays 
significantly higher CDS spreads and elevated volatility 
for most countries due to the GFC. Moreover, the term 
structure is almost flat and at times even inverted, mainly 
because the very short-term end of the curve increased 
significantly during that period. This stands in stark contrast 
to the second subsample (January 2010 – September 2012). 
The steeper slope of the term structure is accompanied by 
lower CDS spread levels and drastically reduced volatility. 
Spain and Italy are the exceptions where CDS spreads 
reach higher levels during the second subsample, which 
includes the European debt crisis.
The implied volatility surfaces are constructed from 
European call and put options on the major European 
indices FTSE100, DAX30, CAC40, MIB40, and IBEX35. For 
the US market we take options on the S&P500. Daily prices 
of all available options are obtained from Datastream. 
Following market practice, we use only out-of-the-money 
(OTM) options for the construction of the implied volatility 
surfaces, see CBOE (2003).
3. Factor Decompositions of CDS Spreads and the Implied Volatility Surface
3.1.  The Term Structure of CDS Spreads
For each European market, we compute the term 
structure of CDS spreads. Since the CDS curves have 
similar properties as the yield curve, we can apply 
a well-established factor decomposition. Let us denote 
by {ln CDS(t, τi ); i = 1...N1 } the time series of CDS spreads 
(in logarithms) for the available maturities. Using 
∆xt(τi ) = ln CDS(t, τi ) − ln CDS(t−1, τi ), we can perform a principal 
component analysis decomposition as in Litterman and 
Scheinkman (1991). Table 1 contains the eigenvalues, 
computed using a one-year daily sample starting on 
23/05/2007 and expressed as a percentage of the total 
variance (see Da Fonseca and Gottschalk (2013) for an 
example of eigenvector shapes). 
All CDS curves lead to the same decompositions, 
a result similar to that obtained for yield curve studies. 
The first eigenvector is always positive and corresponds to a 
shift of the CDS spread curve. Its associated eigenvalue 
dominates as it represents a large fraction of the global 
variance (85% on average among the five European 
countries). The second eigenvector implies a change of 
the slope because the short-term part is positive, whereas 
the long-term part is negative. The second eigenvalue 
accounts for 10% of the global variance on average. The 
third eigenvector has a U-shaped form and is related to 
a change of the convexity of the term structure. Similar to 
yield curve factor decompositions, the third eigenvalue 
only represents a very small fraction of the global variance 
(around 3%). The overall results resemble what is obtained 
for yield curves in the sense that we get the usual level, slope 
and curvature factor decomposition. It is not necessary to 
go beyond the first three factors as together they explain 
98% of market variance.
Table 1: Eigenvalues for the CDS factors as a percentage of the total variance
France Germany Italy Spain UK Mean
First eigenvalue 76.18 88.98 83.09 80.54 94.04 84.56
Second eigenvalue 18.62 8.11 8.97 12.05 4.04 10.36
Third eigenvalue 2.99 2.39 3.61 4.52 1.57 3.02
Sum 97.79 99.48 95.67 97.10 99.65 97.94
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3.2.   The Implied Volatility Surface
To build an implied volatility surface on which we can 
apply a factor decomposition, we follow the approach 
developed in Cont and Da Fonseca (2002) and used in Da 
Fonseca and Gottschalk (2013). We denote by Cbs(t, st  ,K, T, σ) 
the Black-Scholes formula for a European option (either call 
or put) at time t, with maturity T, strike price K, spot price st and 
volatility σ of the underlying asset. The implied volatilityfor 
an option whose market price is c(t, st , K, T) is denoted by 
σbs ,t (T, K) and is the solution of the equation
cbs (t, st  , K, T, σbs , t (T, K)) = c(t, st  , K, T)                                                            ❶
As the Black-Scholes formula is monotonic with respect 
to volatility, this equation has a unique solution, and the 
function {σbs,t(K, T); (K, T)} is called the implied volatility 
surface. We can parametrize this function in terms of time 
to maturity and moneyness (m = K/st ), so we define the 
function It (m, τ) = σbs ,t(mst , t+τ). As this surface is usually non-flat 
and exhibits a U-shaped form for all times to maturity with 
less convexity for long-term options, it is often referred to as 
the smile. The smile fluctuates over time.
All options sets lead to same-shaped factors as well as 
the same eigenvalue decomposition (see Da Fonseca 
and Gottschalk (2013) for an example). The eigenvalues 
(computed using a one-year daily sample starting on 
23/05/2007 and expressed as a percentage of the 
total variance) are presented in Table 2. Since the first
eigensurface is always positive, it is associated with 
a translation or shift of the smile. As the first eigenvalue 
accounts for 75% of the global variance on average, 
we conclude that a one-factor model, based on this 
eigensurface, provides a reasonably good model for the 
dynamics of the smile. For a more accurate model we need 
to go beyond this first factor. The second eigensurface is, 
for all times to maturity, positive for moneyness lower than 
one and negative otherwise. A shock along this mode 
implies that out-of-the-money (OTM) put options, whose 
volatility is given by the smile with moneyness lower than 
one, will become more expensive. OTM call options, whose 
volatility is given by the smile with moneyness greater than 
one, will become less expensive. As a consequence, this 
eigensurface is associated with a bear market movement. 
The corresponding eigenvalue represents 17% of the total 
variance on average. This factor affects the skew of the 
smile. Lastly, the third eigensurface is associated with 
a bull market movement. A shock along this eigensurface 
implies a decrease of long-term implied volatility for all 
times to maturity, a strong increase of short-term OTM call 
prices and a lesser increase of short-term OTM put prices. 
Its eigenvalue is equal to around 5% of the total variance. 
As the first three eigenvalues account for 97% of the total 
variance, it is not necessary to go beyond these three 
factors.
 
Table 2: Eigenvalues for the volatility factors as a percentage of the total variance 
CAC40 DAX30 MIB40 IBEX35 FTSE100 Mean
First eigenvalue 84.18 77.52 71.34 74.73 67.48 75.05
Second eigenvalue 8.16 14.08 17.04 19.64 25.44 16.87
Third eigenvalue 5.91 6.18 5.32 2.94 4.09 4.89
Sum 98.25 97.77 93.70 97.31 97.00 96.81
 
We can now decompose the dynamics of the smile into 
these factors. We define the three scalar processes
We can now decompose the dynamics of the smile into 
these factors. We define the three scalar processes
                                                                              ❷
 
which are the projection of the implied volatility change 
on the eigensurfaces, hence each one quantifies to which 
 
extent the smile “moves” along the direction given by the 
corresponding factor. Therefore, ∆VOL1,t is associated with 
a shift of the smile, ∆VOL2,t with a change of the skew (slope) 
of the smile, and ∆VOL3,t with a change of the convexity 
of the smile. The principal component analysis relates the 
functions used to the covariance structure of the process. 
The factor decomposition allows us to reduce the dynamics 
of the smile, which is a surface, into three scalar time 
series that encompass most of the statistical properties. 
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4. Cross-Hedging Between Credit 
and Volatility Factors
In this section, we focus on a regression analysis of 
the first factor (i.e. the main factor). More precisely, we 
regress the first volatility factor on a set of explanatory 
variables chosen among the credit factors. Since 
we have three credit factors, we perform three 
regressions. Also, we reverse the analysis by regressing 
the first credit factor on a set of volatility factors. These 
regressions are of practical interest as they allow us to 
devise cross-hedging strategies. The regressions are 
 
 ❸
 
                                                                                                  
❹
with N successively equal to {1, 2, 3}. The regression 
coefficients of these equations can be seen as hedging 
ratios. Of special importance is the adjusted R2 of these 
regressions as it measures the effectiveness of the hedge.
Our approach is of interest for trading activities 
involving credit and volatility derivatives as the ratio 
computed in the regressions above can be used for the 
risk management of such portfolios of derivatives. Our 
work is in line with derivatives-oriented papers focusing on 
the credit-volatility relation; see, e.g., Carr and Wu (2007, 
2010, 2011), and Carverhill and Luo (2011). The first two 
papers present consistent pricing frameworks for the two 
markets but are very challenging to implement. The third 
one proposes an equity derivative, the DOOM put, which 
mimics the CDS payoff. The last paper calibrates a three-
factor intensity model on CDO quotes and analyses the 
interaction of these factors with factors driving the implied 
volatility surface. Our approach jointly analyses the entire 
implied volatility surface and the entire term structure of 
CDS spreads and is very simple to implement. As we have 
two subsamples, the first with the GFC and the second with 
the European sovereign debt crisis, we present the results 
separately.
4.1.  Credit-Volatility Disconnection During the GFC
We first analyse the GFC period and report in Table 3 (left-
hand side) the regressions for the US, the UK, France, and 
Spain for the period 23/05/2007 – 31/12/2009. All regressions 
lead to small R2, no matter whether we consider the credit 
risk factor as dependent variable and the volatility factors as 
explanatory variables or the volatility factor as dependent 
variable and the credit risk factors as explanatory variables. 
To put our results in perspective with the literature, many 
studies find volatility, usually given by the ATM 1-month 
implied volatility, to be a rather good explanatory variable 
of credit risk, given by the 5-year CDS spread. For example, 
in Ericsson, Jacobs and Oviedo (2009), the regression of 
the change in the 5-year CDS spread on the change of 
equity volatility (computed as mean squared log returns), 
leads to an R2 of 12%. Most other studies analyse the level 
of the 5-year CDS spread and find volatility (either historical 
or implied) to be a significant explanatory variable with 
the regression R2 rather high. Therefore, from our results we 
conclude that there is a disconnection between the credit 
market and the option market during the GFC. 
 
Table 3: Cross-market factor regressions (23/05/2007 – 17/09/2012) 
 
23/05/2007 – 31/12/2009 01/01/2010 – 17/09/2012
Dependent  
Variable
Independent 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Panel A: United States
∆CDS1 ∆VOL1 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.03*** 0.01*** 0.01**
∆VOL2 0.02 0.02 0.10*** 0.07***
∆VOL3 -0.12** -0.19***
Adj. R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.23 0.35
∆VOL1 ∆CDS1 -0.03 -0.09 -0.13 1.31*** 1.10*** 1.14***
∆CDS2 -1.02** -1.05** -3.72** -3.54**
∆CDS3 -1.16 0.44
Adj. R2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.05
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Panel B: United Kingdom
∆CDS1 ∆VOL1 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.03***
∆VOL2 0.02 0.05** 0.15*** 0.13***
∆VOL3 -0.19*** -0.20***
Adj. R2 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.20 0.25
∆VOL1 ∆CDS1 0.65*** 0.66*** 0.66*** 2.10*** 2.46*** 2.47***
∆CDS2 -0.16 -0.16 -1.50*** -1.52***
∆CDS3 0.13 -0.11
Adj. R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.12 0.12
Panel C: France
∆CDS1 ∆VOL1 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.08*** 0.18*** 0.07***
∆VOL2 0.07*** 0.04* 0.13*** 0.11***
∆VOL3 -0.10*** -0.18***
Adj. R2 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.17
∆VOL1 ∆CDS1 0.87*** 0.85*** 0.87*** 1.19*** 1.18*** 1.07***
∆CDS2 -0.39 -0.33 0.13 0.06
∆CDS3 -0.62 1.49**
Adj. R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.10
Panel D: Spain
∆CDS1 ∆VOL1 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11***
∆VOL2 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.02
∆VOL3 -0.11** 0.11**
Adj. R2 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.15
∆VOL1 ∆CDS1 0.89*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 1.36*** 1.39*** 1.00***
∆CDS2 -0.38 -0.38 0.83* -0.80
∆CDS3 -0.07 3.94***
Adj. R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.15 0.17
 
Note: Regression intercepts have been suppressed in order to conserve space. The symbol *** denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
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This is problematic because from a theoretical point 
of view credit risk and volatility are closely related. This 
is one of the main messages of Merton (1974) and the 
subsequent extensions, Black and Cox (1976) and Huang 
and Huang (2012). Because of this relation equity options 
can be used (and are in fact used in practice) to hedge 
credit risk. However, our results underline the fact that the 
hedge is likely to perform poorly and that a short credit risk 
trader might suffer heavy losses. Even though credit risk and 
equity volatility both increased during the GFC, there was 
a breakdown of the intrinsic relationship between these 
markets when in theory the relation should have prevailed 
during the crisis.
Our result is potentially worrying for the following reason. 
From a risk management point of view, the connection 
between credit and equity markets is the basis for all cross-
hedging strategies. This is particularly true at a portfolio or 
aggregate level, and our results illustrate the fact that it 
might be impossible to manage risk. One could argue that 
the entities in the credit market and those in the equity index 
market are not the same, thereby explaining the failure of 
this connection. However, we work at the highest possible 
level, the index level. Note that the regression coefficients 
are significant, hence a correlation between the factors 
exists, but the R2 which indicate the effectiveness of the 
hedge are small.
4.2. Credit-Volatility Connection During the European 
Debt Crisis
We now focus on the second subsample and report 
in Table 3 (right-hand side) the regression results for the 
European markets for the period 01/01/2010 – 17/09/2012. 
All regressions now lead to higher R2, meaning that the 
CDS-volatility relation is reasonably good in the second 
subsample. When we look at how the first credit risk 
component can be hedged using the volatility factors, 
we observe that with only the first volatility factor we 
can achieve an average (among European countries) 
R2 of 13.4%, more than three times the result obtained in 
the first subsample. Important is the fact that during this 
period the Italian and Spanish CDS markets entered into 
the sovereign debt crisis and, therefore, experienced 
a significant increase of their CDS spreads, as shown in Figure 
4. Consequently, even when the CDS and volatility markets 
are volatile, they can still be connected. This aspect is 
crucial from a hedging point of view as underlined before. 
From these results we can also ascertain the impact of 
lower volatility factors. Adding two volatility factors leads 
to an average R2 of 22.6%. If we take into account the fact 
that we work with changes in the dependent variable, this 
is a very good result. The third factor, whose eigenvalue 
is very small, increases the R2 by 3.4%. The second factor 
significantly improves the quality of the regressions for the 
UK (and also for Germany), increasing the R2 by 10%. Its 
impact for France (and also for Italy) is small, improving the 
R2 by 5%, whilst for Spain adding factors beyond the first 
one does not improve the R2 at all. However, the R2 is still 
significantly higher than what we obtain during the GFC.
For the US market, for this second subsample we can 
draw the following conclusions. Contrarily to the European 
market the first volatility factor leads to an R2 of 4%, which is 
quite low. Interestingly, the second volatility factor increases 
the R2 by 19%, which is a huge improvement. Lastly, the 
third factor adds 12% to the R2, in contrast to the European 
results. This case also underlines the importance of lower-
order factors despite their small eigenvalue in the spectral 
decomposition. Furthermore, it has a profound impact on 
the choice of the number of factors because our results 
suggest that, if we wanted to work with a consistent model, 
we would need a three-factor model.
We now analyse the regressions of the volatility factor 
on the credit factors and start with the European countries. 
In this case the situation is rather different. The second and 
third credit factors do not improve the regressions for any 
of the countries as the R2 remain virtually unchanged after 
the addition of these factors. The first credit factor allows 
us to obtain a low R2 of 9% for France, but an average R2 of 
14.5% for the other countries. This is clearly an improvement 
compared with the earlier subsample. What is also 
important to note is that Spain and Italy experienced the 
turmoil of the sovereign debt crisis during that period – 
and still, the connection between the credit and volatility 
markets was intact. For the US, the results are similar in the 
sense that adding factors does not improve the R2 and, in 
contrast with the European markets, the first volatility factor 
leads to an R2 as low as 4%.
In conclusion, the hedge of the credit factor using 
volatility factors can be effective and lower-order factors 
improve the quality of the hedge (as represented by 
the adjusted R2) significantly. The hedge of the volatility 
factor using credit factors cannot be improved beyond 
the first credit factor but the results are reasonably good. 
Two important conclusions emerge from these results. The 
GFC led to a breakdown of the relationship between the 
credit market and the volatility market, jeopardizing any 
attempt to perform credit-volatility cross-hedges during 
that period. However, this relation can be effective during 
a crisis as the Italian and Spanish markets show during 
the second subsample covering the sovereign debt crisis.
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The results also underline the importance of including 
higher modes although the associated eigenvalues might 
be small. Improved explanatory power is found in regressions 
of both the first CDS factor on volatility factors and the first 
volatility factor on CDS factors, although our results suggest 
that the CDS market can be hedged more effectively 
with the volatility market than vice versa. The R2 increase 
between twofold and elevenfold when comparing the 
second to the first subsample. This is interesting insofar as the 
findings apply to all countries across the board, no matter 
whether they were severely affected by the European debt 
crisis (like Spain and Italy) or barely affected (like Germany 
and the UK). We conclude that depending on the nature of 
the crisis the CDS-volatility relation can vanish.
4.3. Analysis of Intra-Market Linkages
During the GFC there was a breakdown of the 
relationship between the credit and the volatility markets 
both in the US and Europe. As this was a global crisis, we 
wonder to which extent the European credit and volatility 
markets were connected to the US markets. To quantify this 
relation we restrict ourselves to the first credit and volatility 
factors and perform regressions of these factors on the first 
US credit and volatility factors separately during the GFC. 
From a mathematical point of view for the credit factors we 
perform the regressions
 
                             ❺
                                       ❻ 
 
These allow us to determine if the European credit factors 
can be hedged using either the US volatility factor (5) or 
the US credit factor (6). Similarly, for the volatility factors we 
carry out the regressions
                              ❼
                                                  ❽
The results for these regressions are reported in Table 4. 
For the European credit factors regressed on the US volatility 
factor and for the European volatility factors regressed 
on the US credit factor we obtain similar results. Namely, 
the adjusted R2 is very small (less than 2%), thus implying a 
poor credit-volatility market linkage. This is not a surprise 
as we cannot expect these relationships to be stronger 
than the relationship between the credit market and the 
volatility market within the same country, which is known 
to be weak for this subsample (see the previous sections 
of this paper). More interesting is the intra-market analysis, 
that is the relation between the US and European credit 
market (volatility market). The regressions of the European 
credit factors on the US credit factor result in high R2 (on 
average 19.6%). Similarly, for the volatility market we obtain 
an average R2 of 22%. Compared with the cross-hedge R2 
of the previous subsection the improvement is significant. 
The implication is that, during the GFC, the hedge of 
a European CDS (volatility) position could have been more 
effective using the US CDS (volatility) market than using the 
European volatility (CDS) market. The same applies to a US 
CDS position, which could have been hedged using the 
European CDS markets.
Table 4: Cross-market and cross-country factor regressions (23/05/2007 - 31/12/2009)
United Kingdom France Spain
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Panel A: Dependent Variable ∆CDS1
∆CDS1,US 0.36*** 0.20*** 0.36***
∆VOL1,US 0.00 0.00 0.01
Adj. R2 0.30 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.25 0.00
Panel B: Dependent Variable ∆VOL1
∆CDS1,US 0.32*** 0.19*** 0.40***
∆VOL1,US 0.52*** 0.45*** 0.38***
Adj. R2 0.02 0.31 0.01 0.29 0.02 0.14
 
Note: In Panel A, each country’s first CDS factor is regressed on the United States’ first CDS and volatility factor. In Panel 
B, each country’s first volatility factor is regressed on the United States’ first CDS and volatility factor. Regression intercepts 
have been suppressed in order to conserve space. The symbol *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 
5% level, and * at the 10% level.
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5. Conclusion
In this work we propose a joint analysis of the term structure of credit default swap spreads and the 
implied volatility surface. Using the methodology developed in Da Fonseca and Gottschalk (2013), we 
develop a factor decomposition for both markets which allows us to study them globally, i.e. the entire 
term structure of CDS spreads and the entire implied volatility surface. We implement our methodology on 
a database of options and CDS spreads for five European countries and the United States in a sample covering both 
the Global Financial Crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis (2007–2012). The factor decompositions for the implied 
volatility surface and the CDS curve allow us to handle the joint statistical properties of the two markets.
To quantify how crises affect the relationship between the credit and volatility markets we perform a regression analysis 
which underlines the cross-hedging opportunities between the two markets. We find that during the European debt crisis 
the connection between the credit and volatility markets is rather good albeit some of the counstries (Spain and Italy) 
experienced severe turmoil over this period. During the GFC there is a clear breakdown of the relationship between the 
two markets for all countries. Robustness checks with US data confirm these results. Consistently with Da Fonseca and 
Gottschalk (2013) we find that the relation is not reciprocal, i.e. credit factors can be hedged more effectively using 
volatility factors than vice versa. Moreover, factors with small eigenvalues can be very important from a cross-hedging 
point of view; this has far-reaching consequences from a risk management perspective as the number of factors chosen 
for a model should not depend only on the eigenvalue decomposition.
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